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This Article predicts that there will be attempts to use courts to try
to broaden the derivative work right in litigation either to prevent the use
of, or claim protection for, literary and artistic productions made by
Artificial Intelligence (AI) machines. This Article considers the normative
valence of, and the (significant) doctrinal pitfalls associated with, such
attempts. It also considers a possible legislative alternative, namely
attempts to introduce a new sui generis right in AI productions. Finally,
this Article explains how, whether such attempts succeed or not, the
debate on rights (if any) in productions made by AI machines is distinct
from the debate on text and data mining exceptions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Artificial Intelligence (AI) machines are increasingly used to assist
authors in creating copyrightable works, but they are also at the point
where they can “create” literary and artistic productions autonomously,
in the sense that the “cause” of the work is not human.1 To do so, AI
machines use machine-learning algorithms and process data corpora
often consisting of existing copyrighted works.2
Enter the derivative work right contained in 17 U.S.C. § 106(2)
(hereinafter “The Copyright Act”). The Copyright Act provides an
exclusive right “to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work”3 and defines “derivative work” in part as any work
“based upon one or more preexisting works.”4 This definition of the right
could loosely be used as a definition of machine-learning when applied
to the creation of literary and artistic productions because AI machines
can produce literary and artistic content (output) that is almost
necessarily “based upon” a dataset consisting of preexisting works.5 For
example, an AI machine can be “fed” existing works composed by J.S.
Bach and produce a new musical composition “in the style of Bach.”6 Or
1 I discuss elsewhere how “cause” (a version of proximate, not simple, cause) is an
appropriate notion to determine whether a literary or artistic work has a human author.
See generally Daniel Gervais, The Machine as Author, 105 IOWA L. REV. 2053 (2020);
Daniel Gervais, The Human Cause, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (R. Abbott, ed., forthcoming 2022). I give multiple examples of
those types of productions in both sources. This Article uses “machine” as a generic term
that may apply to a computer using AI software but could also cover machines capable
of movement, such as a robot painting on canvas.
2 Machine learning is the dominant form of AI. See Roberto Iriondo, Machine
Learning (ML) vs. Artificial Intelligence (AI) – Crucial Differences, TOWARDS AI (Oct. 15,
2018), https://medium.com/datadriveninvestor/differences-between-ai-and-machine
-learning-and-why-it-matters-1255b182fc6 (“‘Machine learning [ML] is the study of
computer algorithms that allow computer programs to automatically improve through
experience.’ — ML is one of the ways we expect to achieve AI. Machine learning relies
on working with large datasets by examining and comparing the data to find common
patterns and explore nuances[,]” quoting Prof. Tom M. Mitchell, former Chair of the
Machine Learning Department at Carnegie Mellon University).
3 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
4 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
5 A well-known example is the machine named e-David, which produces paintings
using a complex visual optimization algorithm that “takes pictures with its camera and
draws original paintings from these photographs.” Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Generating
Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, and Accountability in the 3A Era—The
Human-Like Authors Are Already Here—A New Model, 2017 MICH. STATE L. REV. 659, 662
(2017); see also Section III.A infra.
6 See Gaëtan Hadjeres & François Pachet, DeepBach: A Steerable Model for Bach
Chorales Generation, ARXIV 1 (Dec. 3, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1612.01010v1.pdf
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it can scan works by Rembrandt and produce a new painting in the style
of the Dutch master.7 One can readily see how a broad interpretation of
the derivative work right resulting from a wide-ranging reading of the
statutory definition could provide a very far-reaching tool to copyright
owners.
A quick terminological point should be made before proceeding
further. This Article uses the term “production” to refer to the
perceptible output of an AI machine.8 If this input belongs in the literary
and artistic category, then it is a literary and artistic production. This
terminological distinction is necessary because for that production to be
a “work” (of authorship) protected by the Copyright Act, two conditions
must be met. First, that production must be original and, second, it must
be fixed.9 Originality is not defined in the statute but the Supreme Court
defined it as meaning that the work must be independently created by
its author and must embody expression that is at least minimally
creative.10 The test is satisfied when the work is the result of creative
choices made by the author.11 I have argued elsewhere that originality
implies that the work must be the result of human creative choices.12 To
be as thorough as possible, this Article will treat this question as
unsettled in the caselaw, though it is worth noting that the United States

(last visited Feb. 15, 2022); see also William T. Ralston, Copyright in Computer-Composed
Music: HAL Meets Handel, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 281, 283–91 (2004).
7 See Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 5, at 663.
8 17 U.S.C. § 101 refers to objects protected by the Copyright Act as “original works
of authorship.” In adopting “production” as its terminological stance, this Article
borrows from language used in Article 2 of the most important international copyright
treaty, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of, Sept.
9, 1886, as revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 [hereinafter Berne
Convention]. The Berne Convention had 180 member States as of January 2022. The
United States became a party to the Convention on Mar. 1, 1989. See Contracting Parties:
Berne Convention, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited Dec. 12, 2021). The term “output”
can also be used generically and would include literary and artistic productions made
by a machine.
9 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, COPYRIGHT, § 1(a) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2,
2021).
10 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (citing TradeMark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53
(1884); see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, COPYRIGHT, supra note 9, at §§ 5–7.
11 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, COPYRIGHT, supra note 9, at § 7(b).
12 See Daniel Gervais, The Machine as Author, 105 IOWA L. REV. 2053, 2098–99 (2020);
see also Daniel Gervais, Self-Driving Culture, KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (Nov. 25, 2021),
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/11/25/self-driving-culture/.
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Copyright Office has taken the same position defended by this Author,
as have a number of senior scholars.13
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, it briefly explains how
AI technology works and how AI machines produce literary and artistic
outputs. In Part III, it recalls the ins and outs of the derivative work right
and then its potential new role in the AI context. In Part IV, to situate
and properly cabin its prescriptive findings, it considers possible new
legislation to introduce a sui generis right in AI productions and
assesses the impact of rights in AI productions, if any, on the ongoing
discussions about text and data mining exceptions.
II. THE AI “CREATION” PROCESS & ITS COPYRIGHT RAMIFICATIONS
The purpose of this Part is to offer a brief glimpse into AI
technology only to the extent necessary to discuss the derivative work
right in detail in the next Part. At the most basic level, AI is, first and
foremost, computer code running on one or more computers, often but
not necessarily connected to the Internet, that can learn from a
dataset—sometimes a huge dataset—hence the label “Big Data.”14 This
process is known as machine-learning, which today is “the dominant AI
technology.”15 Machine-learning can be supervised (by humans), or not.
13 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 306 (3d
ed. 2017); Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated
Works, 47 PITT. L. REV. 1186, 1208 (noting that protecting machine productions by
copyright would “over-reward[] the programmer, particularly in light of the fact that the
programmer is no more able to anticipate the output than anyone else”); Jane C.
Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV
1063, 1066 (2003) (arguing that an author is the “human being who exercises subjective
judgment in composing the work and who controls its execution”) (emphasis added);
Sam Ricketson, People or Machines: The Berne Convention and the Changing Concept of
Authorship, 16 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 8 (1991) (noting that at the outset of the Berne
Convention, “[d]espite the omission of a definition of ‘author,’ . . . there was nonetheless
a basic agreement between the contracting states as to the meaning of the term, and,
because of this, it was thought unnecessary to define it”). See generally Jane C. Ginsburg
& Luke Ali Budiardjo, Authors and Machines, 34 BERK. TECH. L.J. 343 (2019) (discussing
the way in which AI can produce literary and artistic content and explaining why
machine productions are almost always at least in some way the product of human
authorship). Naturally, the Internet as “global meme factory” probably makes it easier
than ever to produce derivative content. See Daniel Gervais, Authors, Online, 38 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 385, 385 (2014).
14 Big Data can be defined according to “three essential features, a fourth that,
though not essential, is increasingly typical, and a fifth that is derived from the other
three (or four). Those features are volume, veracity, velocity, variety, and value.” Daniel
Gervais, TRIPS Meets Big Data, in BIG DATA AND GLOBAL TRADE LAW 160–61 (Mira Burri ed.,
2021).
15 U.K. INFORMATION COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE & THE ALAN TURING INSTITUTE, EXPLAINING
DECISIONS MADE WITH AI 7 (2020), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/ico_
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“Unsupervised” in this context means that the system is “trained on a
dataset without explicit instructions or labelled data.”16 Situated
between supervised and unsupervised learning, reinforcement learning
is a third mode of machine-learning, in which humans verify what the
machine learned on its own and hopefully correct mistakes, often using
sampling techniques.17
Machine-learning in all three modes is used both “to discern and
operationalise patterns in data.”18 It uses a set of “computational
methods using experience to improve [its] performance or to make
accurate predictions.”19 Using machine-learning, an AI system can
“automatically generate heuristics” and make autonomous
determinations of various kinds.20 It can adjust its “behavior to enhance
[its] performance on some task through experience.”21 A machine can,
for example, be shown pictures of cats and dogs and then learn the
features of each so that it can recognize cats and dogs it has never “seen”
before.22 The quality of the learning process is obviously dependent on
the quality of the training data, as some well-documented disastrous
examples have brought to light.23
The machine-learning function can take the form of “deep
learning,” a subset of machine-learning using a layered structure of
explaining_decisions_with_ai.pdf [hereinafter EXPLAINING DECISIONS MADE WITH AI]; see
also Iriondo, supra note 2.
16 See EXPLAINING DECISIONS MADE WITH AI, supra note 15, at 7.
17 See Leslie Pack Kaelbling, Michael L. Littman & Andrew W. Moore, Reinforcement
Learning: A Survey, 4 J. A.I. RSCH. 237, 237 (1996).
18 Michael Veale, Governing Machine Learning that Matters 33 (2019) (Ph.D.
dissertation, University College London), https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/
10078626/1/thesis_final_corrected_mveale.pdf.
19 MEHRYAR MOHRI, AFSHIN ROSTAMIZADEH & AMEET TALWALKAR, FOUNDATIONS OF MACHINE
LEARNING 1 (MIT Press 2d ed. 2018).
20 WOLFGANG ERTEL, INTRODUCTION TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 102 (Ian Mackie ed.,
Nathaniel Black trans., Springer-Verlag London Ltd. 1st ed. 2011). AI programmers use
several different algorithmic techniques, depending (usually) on the task at hand. For a
detailed overview, see EXPLAINING DECISIONS MADE WITH AI, supra note 15, at 115–19.
21 Harry Surden, Machine Learning and the Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 89 (2014).
22 See Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s
Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 592 (2018).
23 For example, when Google’s AI created a link between images of Black people and
gorillas. See James Vincent, Google “Fixed” Its Racist Algorithm By Removing Gorillas
From Its Image-Labeling Tech, THE VERGE (Jan. 12, 2018, 10:35 AM), https://
www.theverge.com/2018/1/12/16882408/google-racist-gorillas-photo-recognitionalgorithm-ai. Another example is when a new Microsoft AI chatbot quickly turned racist
by “learning” on social media. See James Vincent, Twitter Taught Microsoft’s AI Chatbot
to Be a Racist Asshole in Less Than a Day, THE VERGE (Mar. 24, 2016, 6:43 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/24/11297050/tay-microsoft-chatbot-racist.
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algorithms allowing the machine to learn and make predictions and
decisions on its own.24 Deep learning has been called “the true challenge
to artiﬁcial intelligence,” namely “solving the tasks that are easy for
people to perform but hard for people to describe formally—problems
that we solve intuitively, that feel automatic, like recognizing spoken
words or faces in images.”25 With deep learning, one could say—
acknowledging that metaphors are intellectual shortcuts—that the
computer has its own, autonomous brain.26 Importantly, deep learning
is automated and often (if not almost always) removed from direct
human input or control.27
There are various ways to make AI systems learn and produce
better. One of them is the development of General Adversarial Networks
(“GANs”), a technological path likely to grow the affordances of AI
systems both qualitatively and quantitatively.28 GANs’ potential is huge,
because they can learn to mimic any distribution of data. That is, “GANs
can be taught to create worlds eerily similar to our own in any domain:
images, music, speech, prose,” sometimes using smaller datasets.29

24 See Robert D. Hof, Deep Learning: With Massive Amounts of Computational Power,
Machines Can Now Recognize Objects and Translate Speech in Real Time. Artificial
Intelligence is Finally Getting Smart, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 23, 2013), https://
www.technologyreview.com/technology/deep-learning/.
25 IAN GOODFELLOW, YOSHUA BENGIO & AARON COURVILLE, DEEP LEARNING 1 (MIT Press
2016).
26 See Patrick Grieve, Deep Learning vs. Machine Learning: What’s the Difference?,
ZENDESK (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.zendesk.com/blog/machine-learning-and-deeplearning/; see also Claudio Masolo, Supervised, Unsupervised and Deep Learning, TOWARDS
DATA SCI. (May 7, 2017), https://bit.ly/2BydnE8.
27 This has now gone mainstream. See William Vorhies, Automated Deep Learning –
So Simple Anyone Can Do It, DATA SCI. CENT. (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.datascience
central.com/profiles/blogs/automated-deep-learning-so-simple-anyone-can-do-it.
28 Yann LeCun, Facebook’s AI Research Director and a professor at NYU, described
GANs as “the most interesting idea in the last 10 years in [machine learning].” Yann
LeCun, What Are Some Recent and Potentially Upcoming Breakthroughs in Deep
Learning?, QUORA (July 28, 2016), https://www.quora.com/What-are-some-recent-andpotentially-upcoming-breakthroughs-in-deep-learning. GANs are “adversarial” because
two machines work one against the other, creating a constant feedback loop that
increases the quality of outputs. See AI WIKI, A BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO GENERATIVE
ADVERSARIAL NETWORKS (GANS), https://wiki.pathmind.com/generative-adversarialnetwork-gan [hereinafter BEGINNER’S GUIDE] (last visited Feb 15. 2022).
29 BEGINNER’S GUIDE, supra note 28. More specifically, GANs use an actor-critic model,
as one machine, “called the generator, generates new data instances, while the other, the
discriminator, evaluates them for authenticity; i.e., the discriminator decides whether
each instance of data it reviews belongs to the actual training dataset or not.”. Id.; see
also JAKUB LANGR & VLADIMIR BOK, GANS IN ACTION: DEEP LEARNING WITH GENERATIVE
ADVERSARIAL NETWORKS 3 (Manning Publications Co., 2019).
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GANs have been used to create literary and artistic content. Indeed, a
painting produced by a GAN was sold at auction in 2018 for $432,500.30
What the technology described above boils down to is that a large
amount of the inputs needed for an AI machine to produce
contemporary literary and artistic content is inevitably preexisting
copyrighted works that are still protected, unlike the Bach and
Rembrandt examples mentioned above for which the term of protection
(assuming it even existed in some form at the time) has long expired.31
In deep learning scenarios, a large dataset is typically used. In the case
of GANs, a smaller set of preexisting works may well be sufficient.32
III. A NEW ROLE FOR THE DERIVATIVE WORK RIGHT?
A. Overview of the Derivative Work Right
If there is one definition in the United States Copyright Act that
raises eyebrows and uses language that cannot literally mean what it
says, it is the definition of “derivative work.” That definition in relevant
part reads as follows: “a work based upon one or more preexisting works,
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”33 What this Article
means when it says that the definition cannot literally mean what it says
is simply that human creations are often, if not almost always, based
upon some other work that the author has read, seen, consulted,
experienced, or been influenced by in some other way.34 There is a socalled general osmosis of creativity through both space and time that

30 James Vincent, Christie’s Sells Its First AI Portrait for $432,500, Beating Estimates
of $10,000, THE VERGE (Oct. 25, 2018, 1:03 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/
25/18023266/ai-art-portrait-christies-obvious-sold.
31 The current term of protection for most works under U.S. law is the life of the
author plus seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
32 Hence the frequent use of the term Big Data. For an explanation and definition,
see Daniel J. Gervais, TRIPS Meets Big Data, supra note 14.
33 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
34 For example, it is well-known that to learn creative writing or art humans learn
from existing masterpieces and other works. See Daniel Gervais, The Derivative Right,
or Why Copyright Protects Foxes Better than Hedgehogs, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 785,
851 (2013) [hereinafter Gervais, Foxes] (“By copying a master’s work, the ‘pupil’ might
at least get a glimpse of the great author’s mind, which would seem like a normatively
desirable process. ‘L’art naît d’un regard sur l’art,’ as the French would say: art is born
from a view on existing art.”).
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the famous saying often attributed to Isaac Newton that we “stand on
the shoulder of giants” captures in part.35
Given the “or in any other form” language in the definition of
“derivative work,” which signals that the definition is not exhaustive, an
attempt to read the broad language of the first part of the statutory
definition (the “based upon” clause) can be restrained by the
enumeration that follows in application of the ejusdem generis rule.36
One can argue that the list captures the major forms of derivation that
come under the derivative work umbrella and that the opening clause
may then just capture what I have elsewhere labelled “penumbral
derivatives.”37 Other arguments to limit the reach of the right exist.
Professor Paul Goldstein for example, has argued that, considering the
enumeration, the statutory text is intended primarily to protect certain
licensing markets, though he acknowledges that even following that
approach sometimes courts have incorrectly overextended the right’s
scope.38
The risk of an overextension by interpretation is real.39 As this
Article adumbrated in the Introduction and explains further in the next
Part, with AI the debate takes on a potentially more complex hue.40 As
we apply the derivative work right to AI productions, we face obstacles
stemming from controversial and uncontroversial aspects of the
derivative work right. Let us begin with the latter.
See generally ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS 8–12 (1993). Professor
Bridy, for example, has argued along those lines “all cultural production is inherently
derivative.” Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent
Author, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 12 (2012).
36 On the ejusdem generis rule, see Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 74 (1984):
When general terms follow an enumeration of persons or things, such general words
should not be construed in their widest extent, but should apply only to persons or
things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. In 17 U.S.C. §
101, of course, the general words of the “based upon” clause precede instead of follow,
but the canon could still be invoked. The canon, however, “cannot be used to ‘obscure
and defeat the intent and purpose of Congress’ or ‘render general words meaningless.’”
United States v. Kaluza, 780 F.3d 647, 661 (5th Cir. 2015).
37 See Gervais, Foxes, supra note 34, at 808.
38 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 7.3 (3d ed. 2012); Paul Goldstein,
Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 221
(1983) (noting that “[i]t is no coincidence that the principal cases establishing broad
rights against infringement by derivative works characteristically involve situations in
which the alleged infringer had at some earlier point sought a license.”).
39 I am not the first scholar to point to the interpretive risks associated with the
“based upon” clause. See, e.g., Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK.
L. REV. 1213, 1263–67 (1997) (proposing a narrow formulation of the derivative right,
in addition to broader fair use and a possible compulsory license).
40 See infra Section III.A.
35
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B. (Relatively) Uncontroversial Aspects of the Derivative Work
Right
Some aspects of the derivative work right, in this Article’s
submission, are mostly uncontroversial. The first is that a derivative
work for which one claims protection under federal law must be a work.
This requirement implies that a derivative work must itself be original
to be eligible for copyright protection.41 Second, unless one is prepared
to violate the basic canon of statutory construction that guards against
superfluity, the derivative work right cannot have the exact same scope
as the right of reproduction.42 This logically implies that, although the
Venn diagram of the two rights would show considerable overlap, some
derivative works are not reproductions. Third, because the definition
clearly refers to preexisting works, what is derived from must be one or
more “works,” i.e., works protected by copyright.43 Fourth, the notion of
originality applied to the protection of derivative works requires that
the person claiming to have authored a derivative work must have
added or transformed one or more preexisting works in some way,
shape, or form.44
By combining the four above points, one can posit fairly safely that
the derivative work right, properly applied and understood, is situated
in a zone between (and occasionally “beyond”45) reproduction, on the
one hand, and uses that are inspired by, but not infringing (because they

See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, COPYRIGHT, supra note 9.
See GEORGE COSTELLO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 12 (2006) (“[S]tatutes should be construed ‘so as to avoid
rendering superfluous’ any statutory language.”).
43 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106, supra note 4 and accompanying text. Arguably, this also
includes works that were protected but whose term of protection expired, although in
such a case the derivative work right would be irrelevant because it could no longer be
enforced.
44 The Copyright Restatement draft refers to this as “original expression contributed
by the author of the derivative work.” See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, COPYRIGHT, supra note
9, § 3(c).
45 This term is used in that very context in Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program
Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 722 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he protection of derivative rights
extends beyond mere protection against unauthorized copying to include the right to
‘make other versions of, perform, or exhibit the work.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting
Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 n.16 (9th Cir. 1979). Professor Ochoa has argued
in a similar vein that the “reason the right to prepare derivative works was drafted
without any reference to fixation was to make sure that public performances of
derivative works would be covered.” See Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright, Derivative Works
and Fixation: Is Galoob a Mirage, or Does the Form(GEN) of the Alleged Derivative Work
Matter?, 20 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 991, 1020 (2004).
41
42

GERVAIS (DO NOT DELETE)

1120

4/21/22 1:51 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1111

are not “based upon”), an earlier work, on the other hand.46 A final point
that belongs in this Section on less controversial aspects is that a
derivative work is not protected if it is infringing, as the statute itself
makes clear.47
Beyond the points made in the previous paragraph, the analysis
quickly enters more troubled waters.
C. The Originality Controversy
As the previous Section just explained, to be protected as a
derivative work, a literary or artistic production must meet the
originality condition applicable to other works of authorship. Does that
mean that, to infringe the derivative work right (belonging to a third
party), the derivative work must also be original? This is a controversial
area of law. Recall that, to be protected as a work, a work must normally
be both fixed and original.48
Professor Goldstein opined that the derivative work right may be
infringed even if the derivative production would not qualify for
protection as a work.49 The Ninth Circuit agrees, but as we move
forward, one must ask whether this means that the derivative work may
be infringed by a production that need not be original, need not be fixed,
or both.
In two cases with similar fact patterns, a defendant took images
from artwork prints or books and placed them on tiles that he then
offered for sale.50 The defendants’ actions unquestionably did not

46 This Article agrees with the characterization suggested in Timothy Everett
Nielander, The Mighty Morphin Ninja Mallard: The Standard for Analysis of Derivative
Work Infringement in the Digital Age, 4 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 2 (1997), as follows:
On the continuum between an exact reproduction of protected property,
and the creation of an original work, lies a gray zone. This zone is a mixture of protected works—printed art, art on digital media, digital and analog music, and other works recognized as deserving intellectual property
protection—that can be mixed and matched with other works to create
new works. American law recognizes protection of this form of copying
as derivative rights.
47 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (“[P]rotection for a work employing preexisting material in
which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material
has been used unlawfully.”). See, e.g., Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 302 (7th
Cir. 1983).
48 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
49 Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, supra note 38,
at 231 n.75 (1983) (“[T]he Act does not require that the derivative work be protectable
for its preparation to infringe.”).
50 Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1342 (9th Cir.
1988); Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 38 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994).
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involve copying (reproduction) of a protected work. These cases are
interesting because precedents in which the derivative work right is
infringed generally also involve a reproduction. In contrast, these cases
clearly delineate an area for the derivative work right that the
reproduction right does not cover.51 In Mirage Editions, referring to the
statutory language that a derivative work must “recast, transform[] or
adapt[]” one or more preexisting works in some form, the Ninth Circuit
found that the tiles amounted to derivative works.52 In drawing a
distinction between this type of mounting on tiles and traditional art
reframing (which the court acknowledged was a non-infringing
activity), the court found that the use of a resin to glue the pictures on
the tiles made a difference.53 In that case, fixation was obviously not an
issue and originality was not discussed.
In another case, the Ninth Circuit found that it made “no difference
that the derivation may not satisfy certain requirements for statutory
copyright registration itself.”54 The works at issue were both voice
recordings of scripts from the “adventures” of the Lone Ranger and the
duplication, remixing, and distribution of those recordings “just as if he
had hired the actors, sound effects crew, and producers originally used
for the tapes to do a second interpretation of the scripts for an
audience.”55
In another case, the plaintiff argued that the derivative work right
contained in § 106(2) was “intended to expand the definition of
derivative works to include any work based on a copyrighted work.”56
Strangely perhaps, the court states that the plaintiff cited “no authority
to support this novel proposition.”57 There was, however, one authority
in plain view: the text of the statute adopted in 1976.58 This seems to
suggest that the “based upon” clause is not likely to create a huge new
zone of exclusivity for copyright owners compared to the previous
(1909) Act.59
51 Mirage Editions, 856 F.2d at 1343 (“The protection of derivative rights extends
beyond mere protection against unauthorized copying.”)
52 Mirage Editions, 856 F.2d at 1343–44.
53 Id.
54 Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 722 (9th Cir.
1984). The current (1976) Copyright Act entered into force on January 1, 1978. The
facts of the case (Lone Ranger) predate this entry into force.
55 Lone Ranger, 740 F.2d at 722.
56 Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
57 Id.
58 See supra note 4.
59 The “based upon” language was added in 1976. See supra note 4.
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Then in Galoob v. Nintendo, a case involving a technology that
allowed Nintendo video game players to alter features of a game (e.g.,
by increasing the number of lives of the player’s character), the Ninth
Circuit held that the derivative work right could be infringed even
without the production by the defendant of a “fixed” derivative work,
thus eliminating a fixation requirement from the infringement
equation.60 To reach this conclusion, the court found that the statute,
which equates “creation” with “fixation,” was not to be read as
containing an indirect definition of the notion of “work,” only as
providing a definition of the moment of creation/fixation of a work.61
The court also noted that the statutory definition of “derivative work”
did not explicitly require fixation.62 Interestingly, the court considered
a Seventh Circuit case concerning a chip used to speed up video games
where the court found that the defendant’s chip contained a derivative
work.63 The Ninth Circuit drew a distinction because the technology in
the Seventh Circuit case copied the computer chip, whereas the
technology at play in Galoob did not.64 Yet, as the Seventh Circuit itself
acknowledged, the Ninth Circuit noted that it was a “stretch” to find the
chip contained a derivative work, a stretch that the Ninth Circuit
considered a bridge too far.65 As this Article sees it, the Ninth Circuit
cases focus largely on the protection of the market for the original work
and potential derivatives made or authorized by the copyright owner.
Indeed, this Article agrees with Professor Goldstein’s view that a
derivative work “effectively creates a new work for a different
market.”66
There are potentially dissonant notes in Ninth Circuit
jurisprudence, however. For example, in two cases, that Circuit agreed
with the proposition that a “work will be considered a derivative work
only if it would be considered an infringing work if the material which it
has derived from a prior work had been taken without the consent of a

Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967–68 (9th Cir.
1992), as amended (Aug. 5, 1992) (“A derivative work must be fixed to be protected
under the Act, see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), but not to infringe.”).
61 Galoob, 964 F.2d at 968, 970.
62 Id.; Lone Ranger, 740 F.2d at 722
63 Galoob, 964 F.2d at 969 (citing Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009,
1013–14 (7th Cir. 1983)).
64 See id.
65 Id. (citing Midway Mfg., 704 F.2d at 1014).
66 Lone Ranger, 740 F. 2d, at 721 (quoting Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and
Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 217 (1983)).
60
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copyright proprietor of such prior work.”67 This would seem to imply
that the derivative work must meet all the requirements for protection
as a work. The Nimmer treatise and several appellate circuits prefer
that approach.68 According to Nimmer, a “work will be considered a
derivative work only if it would be considered an infringing work if the
material which it has derived from a preexisting work had been taken
without the consent of a copyright proprietor of such preexisting
work.”69
Other circuits have taken what looks like a different approach. In a
case involving a fact pattern fairly similar to Muñoz and Mirage, the
Seventh Circuit considered the Ninth Circuit precedents, but found that
the tiles self-evidently neither “recast” nor “adapted” the preexisting
works.70 The court then took a deeper look at the “transformed” prong
but concluded that the preexisting works were not transformed in the
slightest, a view with which many copyright scholars agree.71 As the
Court noted, the “art was bonded to a slab of ceramic, but it was not
changed in the process. It still depicts exactly what it depicted when it
left Lee’s studio.”72 In deciding that the works lacked the required
originality, the Seventh Circuit ostensibly relied in part on a case
predating the entry into force of the 1976 Copyright Act in which the
Second Circuit en banc found that plastic reproductions of a public
domain cast iron “banks” were not original.73 The Second Circuit
decided in that case to follow “the school of cases in this circuit and
elsewhere supporting the proposition that to support a copyright there
must be at least some substantial variation, not merely a trivial variation
such as might occur in the translation to a different medium.”74
The Seventh Circuit went a step further than Lee v. A.R.T. in
Gracen.75 It held that paintings of the character Dorothy in The Wizard
of Oz (based on stills from the movie) were not original enough to be

67 U.S. v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 965 n.2 (9th Cir.1976); see also Litchfield v. Spielberg,
736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984).
68 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 3.03 (1997).
69 Id. § 3.01.
70 Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997).
71 See Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative
Work Right, 101 GEO. L.J. 1505, 1551 (2013) (“Scholars agree that Lee is more persuasive
than Mirage, and the most recent case to have confronted the choice between Mirage
and Lee followed the latter.”).
72 Lee, 125 F. 3d, at 582.
73 L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc).
74 Id. at 491.
75 Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983).
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protected by copyright.76 The painting even changed the background
using a different scene from the movie. All to no avail.77 Yet the court
also noted that a more or less exact replica of a scene captured from
nature would be original enough.78 Gracen would seem to support the
idea of a heightened originality standard for derivative works, which
most courts have rejected.79 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit also discussed
Mirage, which it described as “much-criticized,” and found the epoxy
glue argument (as compared to traditional framing) “highly
questionable.”80
This tour d’horizon allows us to answer the two above-mentioned
questions. First, if a derivative work is legally produced, then must it
meet the originality and fixation requirements to be protected as a work?
The answer is yes, and the applicable standard is the same as for other
types of works.81 The legal nature of the derivative work can stem from
an authorization from the copyright owner (directly, as a valid sublicense, etc.), from an exception such as fair use, or because the
underlying work is no longer protected.82 Second, to infringe the right
to prepare derivative works in 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), must the alleged
derivative work meet the originality standard, even if the work need not
be fixed? Here, we may face a circuit split, with the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits on one side, and the Ninth Circuit on the other—
though not all of its precedents are necessarily neatly lined up in single
file. Moving forward, either we accept that to infringe the derivative
work right the defendant must have contributed some originality, or the
See id.
“We do not consider a picture created by superimposing one copyrighted
photographic image on another to be ‘original’—always bearing in mind that the
purpose of the term in copyright law is not to guide aesthetic judgments but to assure a
sufficiently gross difference between the underlying and the derivative work to avoid
entangling subsequent artists depicting the underlying work in copyright problems.” Id.
at 305.
78 See id.
79 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 3, comment e (“From time to time, some courts
have suggested that there is a special, heightened originality standard for derivative
works. But most have rejected that view. . . . The better view, and the one adopted by
this Restatement, is one that applies a consistent originality standard to derivative and
non-derivative works.”).
80 Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287,
1299 (11th Cir. 2008).
81 Id.
82 “Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work […] is not an infringement of copyright,” 17 U.S.C. § 107. This means
that fair use covers copyright rights contained in those two sections, including the right
to prepare derivative works.
76
77
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Ninth Circuit correctly stated the law in not looking for originality in the
defendant’s production, even though its application of that law to the
facts of Mirage and Muñoz may well have been incorrect.83 To
summarize where we are:
(a) something must be added or done to a preexisting work to
make a derivative work;84
(b) to be protected as a derivative work, a production must be
original and fixed, and at least partially non-infringing;85
(c) it seems well-established that a production can infringe the
derivative work right even if it is unfixed; and
(d) is the derivative work infringed if a production, whether fixed
or unfixed, recasts, adapts or transforms one or more
preexisting works even if said production is not original?
Before moving to a suggested answer, however, a brief look at the
difference between derivation and reproduction is in order.
D. The Relationship between Reproduction and Derivation
As already noted, the preparation of a derivative work (what one
could label derivation) and reproduction are two of the exclusive rights
of a copyright owner.86 There is little doubt that the two rights, if seen
as separate sets on a Venn diagram, would overlap considerably. Take
the adaptation of a novel to the stage. Much of the novel’s expression
would likely be copied in the play, in particular, of course, the

A question embedded in the first alternative is whether the originality added to
preexisting works must be self-standing, a matter on which there is some degree of
disagreement among scholars. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, § 12:14.50
(2019) (“There is no necessary correlation between originality and infringement. The
statute is to contrary.”). But see 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 7.3 (3d ed. 2005)
(suggesting that a derivative work must contain material that is “capable of standing on
its own as a copyrightable work.”). The latter statement is certainly correct as to
whether a protectable derivative work was produced.
84 Courts have used several tests to decide whether “enough” was added to make a
production a derivative work, but generally in the context of deciding whether it was
protectable, not whether it was infringing. For a discussion, see NIMMER § 3.54 (2020).
There is no disagreement that this Author can see about the need for a protectable
derivative work to be original. The question is whether originality (but not fixation) is
required to infringe.
85 The text of the statute suggests rather clearly that it is only parts of a derivative
work that contain infringing material that are unprotected. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a)
(“[P]rotection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists
does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used
unlawfully.”).
86 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(2).
83
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dialogues.87 Which exclusive right would be infringed? In a nutshell, the
infringement standard for the right of reproduction is one of substantial
similarity between protectable elements of the plaintiff’s work and the
defendant’s work, which essentially means protected expression.88 In
such a case, a reproduction right analysis may be justified yet this is
principally, as this Article sees it, a matter for the derivative work right.
That right can apply even if or when the right of reproduction
reaches its limits. This is not surprising, as the domain of both rights
must be different to avoid superfluity of the statutory text.
A full discussion of the relationship between 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)
and (2) is beyond the scope of this Article. In a previously published
work, I argued that, though the outcome of the analysis (that is,
determining whether the defendant’s work is prima facie infringing or
non-infringing) is often the same, the analytical path is different.89 In
the right of reproduction context, the infringement stems, as just noted,
from the copying of protected expression.90 In the case of derivation,
the test is whether creative choices that gave the plaintiff’s work its
originality were copied.91 The latter analysis could be said to operate at
a higher level of abstraction, as it searches for the actual cause of the
originality instead of the original expressive elements in themselves.92
Adding a teleological layer to the analysis, recall, in addition, that the

Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55–56 (2d Cir. 1936)
(noting that one can also infringe by taking elements from a novel without any of the
dialogues when making an adaptation as a motion picture because “some of it is plainly
drawn from the novel; but that is entirely immaterial; it is enough that substantial parts
were lifted.”).
88 See, e.g., Concrete Mach. Co., Inc. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600,
606 (1st Cir. 1988) (“Copying therefore is generally established by showing that the
defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that the offending and copyrighted
articles are ‘substantially similar.’”). On the limitation that this test is applied to
protectable elements, see Compulife Software Inc. v. Newman, 959 F.3d 1288, 1306
(11th Cir. 2020) (“If the defendant carries this burden as to any portion of the copied
material, that material should be filtered out of the analysis before comparing the two
works.”). Expression is used here to distinguish ideas, which are not protected (under
17 U.S.C. § 102(b)), and “protected expression” is used to indicate that some expression
is not protected; Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., LLP., 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir.
2003) (For example, if in the case of a merger between idea and expression (in which
case the § 102(b) exclusion applies) or the expression constitutes a scène à faire, that is
elements that are “so rudimentary, commonplace, standard, or unavoidable that they do
not serve to distinguish one work within a class of works from another.”).
89 See generally Gervais, Foxes, supra note 34.
90 See supra note 86.
91 See Gervais, Foxes, supra note 34 at 839–47.
92 See id.
87
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purpose of derivation is to adapt or recast the preexisting works for a
different context, such as those listed as illustrations in the statute.93
E. Application to AI
The application of the previous Section’s findings to the first
question above to the AI context means that to be protected under
federal law, the production of an AI machine must have originality. As
this Author has argued elsewhere, this requires human authorship.94
Courts would make what this Author considers a grave mistake if they
protected literary and artistic productions without (human)
originality.95
The answer to the second question is the one that this Article will
now answer more fully. It can be framed as follows: if one considers
that, to infringe the derivative work right, a production must itself be a
work and, therefore, original (but not protected, even if original, if it is
infringing or unfixed, as noted above), then machines that by their nature
cannot produce originality (due to a lack of human cause) cannot infringe
this right.
The solution to this quandary rests in part on a crucial doctrinal
point. If the above proposition is true, it would mean that a machine
translation, adaptation, or other derivation from one or more
preexisting works would be scot-free under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) if it did
not result demonstrably and sufficiently from human creative choices,
because a non-original production cannot be a work, and, therefore, it
cannot be a derivative work.96 Naturally, the machine production could
still be—and in many cases, as we will see shortly, would likely be
considered—a reproduction, one must recall that 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)
and 106(2) must have different real estate to cover.97 The key takeaway
to use going forward in the analysis is that, under the Ninth Circuit test,
a machine could infringe 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) but not under the Seventh
(or Eleventh’s) Circuit’s.
Let us imagine seven different scenarios. For this analysis, let us
assume that the works used are (still) protected by copyright, that is, the
93 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“[T]ranslation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment,
condensation,” although Congress clearly intended this list to be non-exhaustive when
it added “or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”).
94 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. See generally Gervais, The Machine as
Author, supra note 1.
95 See Gervais, The Machine as Author, supra note 1, at 2102–03.
96 Gervais, The Machine as Author, supra note 1, at 2100–01.
97 See supra Sections III.C, D.
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expiration of the term of protection will be set aside for illustrative
purposes.98
Scenario 1. AI machine produces a painting “based upon” a dataset
comprising 100 Impressionist and post-Impressionist paintings showing
landscapes from the South of France. The corpus includes works by
Bonnard, Cezanne, Matisse, Morisot, Renoir, Signac, and others. The
machine’s output gives (if the reader will pardon the pun) the same
impression as a “traditional” Impressionist painting but it does not include
any distinguishable element from any of the paintings in the dataset.99
In this first scenario, as this Article sees it, the computer does not
in fact derive; instead, it finds correlations and patterns to use as a
matrix for its own production. As there is no substantial similarity
between the painting used in the machine-learning context, the issue of
substantial similarity does not apply. When it comes to derivation, the
aggregation of choices into a “blend” where preexisting works are no
longer individually identifiable means that we are not in the presence of
an infringing derivative work—even assuming that what the machine
has produced is a “work.” True, the correlations probably reflect in
some distant way the creative choices that authors of preexisting works
incorporated into their expression, but that does not recast, transform
or adapt identifiable preexisting works.
Scenario 2. AI machine produces a painting of the famous Japanese
bridge in Monet’s garden at Giverny “based upon” a dataset comprising
thirty paintings of the bridge by various artists. The machine’s output
resembles existing paintings, including some by Monet, but none are a
replica.
While the analysis in this second case is fairly similar to the
previous scenario, it is possible that the output, though not a replica, will
bear some substantial similarity to one or more of the works used in the
machine-learning context, which should trigger a reproduction right
analysis, work-by-work. It is much less likely that the machine’s output
would infringe the right to prepare derivative works for three reasons.
First, if there are identifiable, substantially similar elements from
individual works in the data corpus in the machine’s output, then, as just
noted, this should be considered under 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). Second, it

98 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(a), 305 (establishing that for a typical work of art under current
U.S. rules, the copyright lasts for the life of the author plus seventy years, extended until
December 31st of the seventieth year after the author’s death.).
99 OXFORD ILLUSTR. ENCYCL. OF THE ARTS 218 (J.J. Norwich ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1990)
(explaining that the term “Impressionist” was actually used derisively to refer to the
impression that works that tried “to capture the effects of light on various surfaces,
particularly in open-air settings” tried to create).
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strikes the Author as functionally impossible to isolate creative choices
of one author of one preexisting work in a way that would not be in fact
a copy of the actual expression. Third, teleologically, there is no
adaptation or recasting here of the type that the statute suggests is the
purpose of 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). It is a painting similar to those in the
dataset.
Scenario 3. AI machine produces a painting of the same bridge in the
same garden as in the previous scenario, but “based upon” five paintings
all by Claude Monet.
In this third scenario, there is a higher risk that the reproduction
right would be engaged because there is a smaller, finite number (five)
of well-identified works. The derivative work right could also be
relevant under a broad understanding of “based upon” since all the
creative choices are by the same author. One could argue that, if creative
choices were “transferred” from the five paintings to the machineproduced painting, then that could trigger the application of right. But
for the same reasons as in the previous scenario, this Article suggests
that the analysis should be carried out under § 106(1). It is not the
purpose of § 106(2) to be the glazing on the § 106(1) donut, as it were.
Each right has its own target and purpose.
Scenario 4. AI machine produces a painting “based upon” a dataset
of five abstract paintings that contain geometric shapes such as circles,
squares, and triangles.
The main difference between the third and fourth scenarios in
terms of the infringement analysis is that common symbols are not
protected expression.100
Scenario 5. AI machine, using a 3D printer, creates sculptures using
any image or set of no more than five images as its basis. The user of the
AI machine has obtained a license to reproduce the images. When using
more than one image, the machine selects parts of each. The shape of the
sculpture is based on a large database of modern sculptures and images
and is designed to fit what the machine “recognizes” in the image or
images it is asked to “turn into” a sculpture.
This fifth scenario stands directly in the analytical path of this
Article. The images that were reproduced would normally trigger a §
106(1) analysis, but the reproduction is licensed. Then, as images were
transformed into a sculpture, a stronger case of derivation can be made
than in previous scenarios. This is not quite as straightforward as in the

Copyright protects original expression, not common symbols, letters.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, COPYRIGHT, supra note 9, § 5(c).
100

See
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so-called tile cases, where images were simply cut and pasted.101
Moreover, the market for sculptures is possibly quite different than the
market for the images themselves. A real recasting of the image(s) takes
place. Absent fair use or some other defense, the application of § 106(2)
may thus be warranted.
Scenario 6. AI machine produces music “based upon” the dataset in
scenarios 1, 2, and 3 and a vast database of musical recordings containing
classical, jazz, and rock pieces and information about human emotional
reactions to colors and shapes, harmonies, and melodies. In creating the
music, the machine tries to correlate images and sounds that produce
similar emotional reactions.
In this sixth scenario, there is no reproduction of any of the
paintings. Is there a derivation? Again, a broad reading of the statute
could lead to this conclusion and music does appear to be a different
market and a type of transformation that could lead one to argue for the
application of § 106(2). Yet, what is “taken” from the painting does not
appear in the output. The paintings become pure data, as it were. The
distance between the paintings and the musical output is such that
neither § 106(1) nor § 106(2) is triggered.
Scenario 7. AI machine produces a translation into English of all the
novels that won the top literary prizes in fiction in French, Italian,
Japanese and Spanish. No licensing arrangement is in place.102
This scenario demonstrates the problem with the “only original
derivative works can infringe” approach combined with a human
authorship requirement (and recall that abandoning that requirement
could have catastrophic effects103). The machine would be able to
produce these free translations without a license unless one were also
able to make a case under the reproduction right, which takes us back
to the circularity problem: if every violation of 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) is also
a violation of 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), then Congress wasted legislative ink.
Does it make sense to achieve an outcome where machine
productions can produce scot-free (under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), at least)
but not humans? Asked that way, the answer emerges. Machines should

See supra Section III.C for a description of the tile cases.
This isn’t that far-fetched. For examples of sites that offer this service as of early
2022, see Dragneel, Top 5 Machine Translation Sites for Novels, DRAGNEELCLUB (Jan. 1,
2022), https://dragneelclub.com/top-5-machine-translation-sites-for-novels/.
103 See supra notes 12 and Gervais, The Machine as Author, supra note 1. In this case,
this would likely take the floor from under the market for human translators, and that
expertise would be lost.
101
102
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not be placed in a better position than humans.104 Then a teleological
layer can be added to the analysis. If the purpose of the statute is to
allow new creations to be inspired by existing ones, “hopefully, ad
infinitum,” in a cycle that “makes copyright ‘the engine of free
expression,’” then whose expression are we talking about?105
The Supreme Court also wrote that “[b]y establishing a marketable
right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”106 This followed in the wake
of another pronouncement by the Court, three decades earlier, that
“[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and
useful Arts.’”107
As I read these encapsulations of copyright law’s policy
underpinnings, the reward to an author is for what that author has
created, and what is then “derived” (as the term is defined in copyright
law) from her work. As explained above, the key distinction between
reproduction and derivation is that the former copies the expression of
a protected work, while the latter means reusing the creative choices
that make a work original.108 Applied to the AI context, the fact that the
human programmer of the AI machine can get copyright protection for
104 If one wants to claim that machines should have equal rights, then one can
endeavor to prove that point. This Article most certainly will not.
105 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)) (emphasis added). As the
Supreme Court noted, “the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free
expression.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558.
106 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558.
107 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (emphasis added).
108 See Gervais, Foxes, supra note 34, at 807 (“The qualitative part of the reproduction
inquiry focuses chiefly on the form of what was taken while the derivation inquiry looks
at a deeper level of appropriation, namely at whether the creative choices that made the
primary work worthy of copyright protection were taken.”). There is then a separate
question as to whether the person using expression and creative choices contained in
one or more previous works has transformed the same, which would then trigger a fair
use analysis under the now common text of Transformativeness. See R. Anthony Reese,
Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 476 (2008)
(“[I]n cases in which the court found that an alleged infringer had violated—or could be
found to have violated—the derivative work right, courts showed no inclination to treat
the transformation involved in the preparation of the derivative work as
“transformativeness” in analyzing the first fair use factor.”). For a comparative law
analysis, see Mary W. S. Wong, “Transformative” User-Generated Content in Copyright
Law: Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use?, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1075, 1112–1114
(2009).
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the code she produced is not controversial, but then to stretch the beam
of protection to outputs produced by the machine using that code is at
least one step removed—a crucial step. The test will be whether the
creative choices made by the program’s author (or arguably by the user,
if applicable) are present in the machine’s output.109 If not, protecting
that output as the work of the programmer (or user) is incompatible with
both fundamental doctrinal tenets of copyright and its policy purpose,
and it over-rewards the programmer (or user).110
This Article thus concludes that productions need to be original to
infringe 17 U.S.C § 106(2).111 Under an originality test, the question
would be whether a production, if fixed and to the extent that it is noninfringing, would be protectable. In this Article’s view, that is the
incorrect inquiry. Originality, as defined in Feist, is a protection
threshold, not an infringement standard.112
IV. DIFFERENT DEBATES ABOUT OTHER AI-RELATED RIGHTS AND EXCEPTIONS
In this short Part, this Article explores two related areas of law to
ensure that the arguments contained up to this point are neither
misunderstood nor applied out of context. Those two areas are the calls
for a new, sui generis right in AI productions, and the relationship
between the protection of AI outputs and the need for text and data
mining exceptions.
A. Sui generis rights
If courts follow the doctrinal and/or normative views expounded
in this Article and espoused in whole or in part by several other scholars,
then there would be no copyright protection for AI productions that do
not have a human cause.113 As the previous Section explicated, AI
machines that process datasets consisting of protected works will,
however, be able to produce outputs that infringe both the reproduction
and, in some cases, the derivative work right. The first of those
conclusions will quickly find in its way a normal reflex in our market-

See Gervais, The Machine as Author, supra note 1, at 2095–96.
See Samuelson, supra note 13, at 1208 (It would “over-reward[] the programmer,
particularly in light of the fact that the programmer is no more able to anticipate the
output than anyone else.”). Anticipation is of course directly related to causality.
111 In saying that, however, this Article would still take the view that, as applied to
their facts (tiles on which images were glued), Mirage and Munoz were wrongly decided.
See supra note 50.
112 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
113 See Gervais, The Human Cause, supra note 1.
109
110
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based economy to appropriate any value that can be traded.114 Hence,
if copyright is not available, calls for a new, so-called sui generis right
will likely emerge. Indeed, they already have.115
Sui generis protection of databases, as it exists in the European
Union (EU), is predicated not on progress of science and useful arts or
human progress more generally but rather on investment protection.116
The temptation to create such a right is simple, yet ill-founded. The
argument goes as follows: there is investment in AI and any investment
should benefit from some form of legal protection. This claim is either
false or at least a major overstatement.117 Then, the temptation is also
based on the fact that sui generis rights do not require originality, which
obviates the doctrinal difficulty explained in the previous Part.118
There are several solid arguments that cast serious doubt on the
usefulness of a sui generis right in AI machine productions. First, this
Author has been unable to find convincing evidence of underinvestment
in AI research and development.119 Second, AI machines may in short
114 See Gregory Alan Bonadies, Property Rights and International Trade: An
Institutional Determinant of Export Structure, at 14 (Dec. 2016) (Ph.D. dissertation, The
University of Southern Mississippi) https://aquila.usm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1904&context=dissertations (“Governments exist to develop and implement
systems of property right laws to control the use and exchange of property for public
and private purposes including production.”).
115 See Ana Ramalho, Will Robots Rule the (Artistic) World?: A Proposed Model for the
Legal Status of Creations by Artificial Intelligence Systems, 21 J. INTERNET L. 1, 20 (2017)
(“It also is possible to consider the grant of a sui generis right in AI-created works, much
as the EU legislature decided to do for makers of databases. The common rationale here
is protection of investment.”); Ricketson, supra note 1, at 36–37 (suggesting that humans
who own or use machines might “obtain strong and effective protection under a
neighboring rights or sui generis regime”).
116 See Ramalho, supra note 115; Katleen Janssen & Jos Dumortier, The Protection of
Maps and Spatial Databases in Europe and the United States by Copyright and the Sui
Generis Right, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUT. & INFO. L. 195, 214 (2006) (noting that the EU’s
sui generis database right “protects the investment in a database, and not creativity”).
117 There is some form of protection, for example against expropriation or, in the case
of foreign investment by multinationals, under investor-state-dispute-settlement
(“ISDS”), but there is no rule that any and all investment must be protected by law. See
Daniel Gervais, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Human Rights and Regulatory Lessons
from Lilly v. Canada, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 459, 466 (2018) (“ISDS provides multinational
corporations a right to sue states that are parties to an investment treaty (such as a
bilateral investment treaty or BIT) or a trade agreement containing an investment
protection chapter for direct or indirect expropriation.”).
118 See C.D. Freedman, Should Canada Enact a New Sui Generis Database Right?, 13
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 35, 37–38 (2002) (explaining that EU law
protects “both original and unoriginal databases”).
119 Quite the opposite. For example, the International Data Corporation forecasts
accelerating growth over the next few years. See IDC Forecasts Improved Growth for
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order be able to produce massive amounts of literary and artistic output,
which will quickly risk crowding out the field if each production was
protected by exclusive copyright rights, or even a sui generis right
against some form of reuse.120 Third, while the United States does not
have sui generis database protection (despite several failed attempts in
Congress to enact it), it does not seem to have provided the EU with a
noticeable comparative advantage in database investment.121 If
anything, the database directive is viewed as a policy failure.122
Against this backdrop, it seems reasonable to suggest that
proponents of a new sui generis right in literary and artistic productions
of AI machines bear the burden of proof. They should not be allowed to
rely simply on hollow-ringing policy clichés. At the very least, one
should be able to identify a market failure, and that failure cannot be the
insufficiency of the rate of replacement of human authors in the
marketplace, as this is the exact opposite of what policy endeavors
should aim for.123 Lastly, if and when the proponents of a sui generis
right are able to discharge their burden of proof, there will remain
“immense challenges” in defining the exact contours of the right.124

Global AI Market in 2021, INT’L DATA CORP. (Feb 23, 2021), https://www.idc.com/
getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS47482321.
120 See Patrick Zurth, Artificial Creativity? A Case Against Copyright Protection for AIGenerated Works, 25 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 15 (Spring 2021). EU law, namely the Directive
96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal
Protection of Databases, provides a right against certain forms of “extraction” of data,
rather than traditional copyright exclusive rights.
121 On attempts to introduce EU-style law in the United States, see Janssen &
Dumortier, supra note 116, at 223 (“Since the introduction of the European database
directive in 1996, a number of bills have been introduced in the U.S. Congress, some of
which were based on the database directive . . . .”). See also Samuel E. Trosow, Sui
Generis Database Legislation: A Critical Analysis, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 534, 627 (2004–05);
Daniel Gervais, The Protection of Databases, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1109–1169 (2007).
122 See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document: Executive
Summary of the Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of Databases,
SWD (2018) 147 final (Apr. 25, 2018), https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/
library/staff-working-document-and-executive-summary-evaluation-directive-969eclegal-protection-databases (“[T]he sui generis right continues to have no proven impact
on the overall production of databases in Europe, nor on the competitiveness of the EU
database industry.”).
123 For a more complete explanation on this point, see Gervais, The Machine as
Author, supra note 1.
124 Peter K. Yu, Data Producer’s Right and the Protection of Machine-Generated Data,
93 TUL. L. REV. 859, 929 (2019).
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B. Text and Data Mining
Up to this point, this Article has essentially focused on the output
of AI machines. Text and data mining (“TDM”) is the flip side of the
process—namely, the input. It refers to “computational processes for
applying structure to unstructured electronic texts and employing
statistical methods to discover new information and reveal patterns in
the processed data.”125 The terms “text” and “data” are “broad enough
to include fixed images, sound recordings, and audio-visual works.”126
The ultimate example of TDM might be Google scanning entire libraries
of books, a process that the Second Circuit determined was a fair use.127
The EU, whose legislative experiment about databases was discussed in
the previous Section, has experimented in this area as well, with the
adoption in 2019 of a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market
that provides two separate provisions on TDM.128 The first exception
allows TDM “for the purposes of scientific research” by “research
organisations and cultural heritage institutions.”129 The second
exception is not limited to any particular category of user, but
rightsholders are able to opt out.130 The Directive also explains that
“there is widespread acknowledgment that text and data mining can, in
particular, benefit the research community and, in so doing, support
innovation.”131 Other countries have also adopted similar TDM
exceptions and limitations, including Japan and Singapore.132
125 Eleanor Dickson et al., Synthesis of Cross-Stakeholder Perspectives on Text Data
Mining with Use-Limited Data: Setting the Stage for an IMLS National Forum 5,
https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/100055/IMLSNationalForu
m_TDM_DiscussionPaper.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y (last visited Jan. 30, 2022); see
also Veale, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
126 Matthew Sag, The New Legal Landscape for Text Mining and Machine Learning, 66
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y. U.S.A. 291, 294–95 (2019).
127 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2014); Authors Guild v.
Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2015). There is little doubt in this Author’s mind
that the main value of this corpus is not in making snippets available (though that is
what gave the use its fair nature), but the possibilities afforded by the mining of the data.
At this point, only Google and those it partners with can reap that benefit.
128 Directive 2019/790, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April
2019 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and Amending
Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92.
129 Id. art. 3(1).
130 Id. art. 4(3).
131 Id. recital 8.
132 On Japan, see generally Tatsuhiro Ueno, The Flexible Copyright Exception for ‘NonEnjoyment’ Purposes ‒ Recent Amendment in Japan and Its Implication, 70 GRUR INT’L
145 (2021). For a summary of the Singapore provisions, see Alban Kang & Pin-Ping Oh,
Coming Up in Singapore: New Copyright Exception for Text and Data Mining, BIRD & BIRD:

GERVAIS (DO NOT DELETE)

1136

4/21/22 1:51 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1111

In the United States, the solution is more likely to come from courts
interpreting the fair use doctrine than from Congress.133 Be that as it
may, the debate about allowing TDM inputs, which can have a positive
valence in many areas, for example, in assisting scientific research,
should be dissociated from the separate matter of the protection that
applies, or could apply, to the outputs of AI machines.
V. CONCLUSION
Lawmaking by courts and legislators in the coming years will
include the unprecedented challenge of adapting “our” legal system to a
new, artificially intelligent “species” that can mimic and indeed surpass
humans at many tasks involving the one feature that had distinguished
humans from other species, and indeed allowed the dominion of
humans over those species.134 One of the specific challenges will be the
adaptation of copyright law to literary and artistic productions of AI
machines. This Article makes a contribution to the exploration of this
challenge by explicating how the derivative work right, sometimes seen
as copyright’s poor cousin in a house occupied mostly by the rights of
production and public performance, may be called upon to step forward
in litigation to either protect machine productions or find them
infringing, in part because the very process of AI-based machine
learning, which leads to those productions, is arguably a form of
derivation. This Article explained why the scope of the derivative work
right should be cabined in that context and considered the caselaw
concerning the requirement that a derivative work be original and
suggests how it should be applied in the AI context. Finally, this Article
also briefly discussed proposals to create a non-copyright, sui generis
right in machine outputs, and clarified the linkage between the debates
about copyright in such outputs and exceptions designed to allow text
and data mining.

NEWS CTR. (Sept. 19, 2021), https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2021/
singapore/coming-up-in-singapore-new-copyright-exception-for-text-and-datamining.
133 See Sag, supra note 126, at 366 (explaining that U.S. courts do not see TDM as
interfering with the protection of copyrighted works).
134 See generally Daniel Gervais, Towards an Effective Transnational Regulation of AI,
AI & SOC’Y (2021).

